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ABSTRACT 
 This study attempts to identify the types of pharmaceutical companies that 
utilize university employees as directors on their boards and if in fact having 
university connections on a pharmaceutical board impacts company performance.  
Board-level data from 2009 and firm-level data from 2008 was gathered for 109 
pharmaceutical companies that varied greatly in size and geographic location.  
The key findings of this study were that the larger the pharmaceutical company 
and the greater the R&D expense of that company the more likely the company 
would have university connections on its board of directors; the larger the 
company, the better the universities and medical schools these directors would be 
employed at.  These connections are believed to symbolize and secure strategic 
alliances between pharmaceutical companies and academic institutions.  
Pharmaceutical companies can therefore tap into innovative research pipelines at 
these universities for new drug discovery and development.  While there was not 
strong evidence that university connections on a pharmaceutical board directly 
impacted company performance, larger pharmaceutical companies, who were 
more likely to utilize such connections, did yield greater earnings per share and 
return on assets than smaller companies, who were less likely to utilize such 
connections on their boards. 
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PREFACE 
 “The human race can survive perfectly well without an endless supply of 
new drugs but the corporations that produce them can’t” (Law, 2006).  In the 
pharmaceutical industry time truly is money.  With blockbuster drug monopolies 
expiring after 20 years of patent protection, the companies that make these drugs 
are forced to continue to innovate; utilizing new drug technologies and an 
extensive and diverse pipeline of research and development in order to bring new 
drugs to the market.  However, developing new drugs is not a given, and in fact, 
new drugs are becoming more and more of a rarity in an industry that needs them 
in order to be sustainable.  Companies simply cannot exist solely on blockbusters 
when generics or ‘me-too’ drugs steal their market share as their patent lives wear 
off.  Numerous methods and strategies exist to keep the drug pipeline pumping.  
A common move is for pharmaceutical companies to join strategic alliances, 
merge, or acquire other firms. When this occurs, the joint or parent company 
increases its catalog of not only drugs presently on the market, but drugs in 
development and research pipelines to create the necessary innovation for future 
sustainability.   
 While the pharmaceutical industry regards itself as a research-based, life-
saving industry, justifying high drug prices to fund present and future 
development, many may be surprised to learn that most of the R&D in this 
industry is outsourced, and not in the research labs of Pfizer or Johnson & 
Johnson.  So the question becomes, where is this R&D outsourced to?  The 
majority of the R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is performed by (1) the 
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government, the National Institute of Health (NIH), (2) small biotechnology 
companies, and (3) academic institutions.   
Number (3) is where I will focus this study.  When corporate governance 
of pharmaceutical companies is examined, a common theme becomes apparent.  
Pharmaceutical companies often have university employees on their board of 
directors, and thus university connections.  Whether they are medical professors, 
non-medical professors, or even chancellors, the fact of the matter is that these 
directors are affiliated with a university; a potential R&D pipeline for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Thus, my initial reaction was, you don’t have to look 
much further than a pharmaceutical companies’ board of directors to learn what 
kind of university research connections it has.  Through my extensive research of 
109 pharmaceutical companies, patterns began to emerge, and became so clear to 
me that I was able to quite accurately predict the number of university members 
on a pharmaceutical company’s board, and the quality of universities these 
directors were affiliated with.   
The research on this topic began through my interest in innovation.  My 
initial topic was to research how Apple had gained such a dominant market share 
position through its innovation of MP3 Players; the iPod.  However, to do an 
appropriate study, there simply weren’t enough players in the industry.  Thus, 
Professor Dharwadkar introduced me to another industry, pharmaceuticals.  My 
initial exposure was through the text The Truth About the Drug Companies, by 
Marcia Angell, M.D.  I became quite interested with the theme of R&D spending 
versus marketing spending in the industry, and how firms mask such high 
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marketing spending to maintain the perception of being research-driven, or life-
saving for that matter.  Over the course of the next year I read numerous texts and 
articles on the industry, developing a list of common themes.  Eventually, I 
narrowed down my interests to patents, blockbuster drugs, and university-industry 
relations.  Having already taken the initiative of researching the top medical 
schools and examining the board of directors at Fortune 500 pharmaceutical 
companies, combined with Professor Dhardwadkar’s expertise in corporate 
governance, I chose this area to focus my study on.  With the initial question of 
what makes one pharmaceutical company more innovative than another, we 
would be looking for trends in corporate governance, university connections, and 
performance in the industry, 
To offer a brief introduction and illustration of the research I conducted, 
and the data I extracted, I will highlight Johnson & Johnson, an American 
pharmaceutical company with over 118,000 employees and $63.747 billion in 
sales in 2008 (the largest pharmaceutical company in the world at the time, which 
has now been surpassed by Pfizer following its late 2009 acquisition of Wyeth).  
Johnson & Johnson currently has 10 directors on its board, four of whom are 
employed by universities.  These include two medical-related university 
employees: Susan L. Lindquist, Ph.D., Professor of Biology at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology; and David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D., Director at the 
Morehouse School of Medicine, and two non-medical university employees: 
Mary Sue Coleman, Ph.D., President of the University of Michigan, and Michael 
M.E. Johns, M.D., Chancellor of Emory University.  With one of the largest 
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pharmaceutical companies in the world having a board made up of 40% university 
employees, one would be safe to assume that their place on the board matters, and 
matters greatly.  Based on credible international university rankings and medical 
school rankings we can then identify the quality of the universities these directors 
come from and the type of pharmaceutical companies that utilize them.  Certainly 
one would expect a larger, more established pharmaceutical company to be more 
likely to have a Harvard Medical School professor on its board than a smaller, 
unproven company.  But if this expectation is in fact a reality, what realistic 
difference does this make?  How does having such connections impact the 
company? And what types of pharmaceutical companies have such university 
connections on their boards?                                                                          
Before I get into the methodology of my study and its findings, it is 
important to provide an in-depth look into the pharmaceutical industry as a whole.  
My literature review will cover the areas of patents, research and development, 
open innovation and externalization of R&D, and the focus of my study: 
university connections through pharmaceutical companies’ corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
ADVICE TO FUTURE STUDENTS 
 
 The Honors Capstone project can be a long and tedious process.  Think of 
it more as a journey rather than a project.  It’s an elaborate and mind-opening 
education on a topic of your choice, in the field you wish to gain greater expertise 
in.  While it’s easier said than done, I highly suggest starting as early as you 
possibly can.  If you can already be making headway your fall of your Junior 
year, you’ll be in great shape.  This is not something you want to rush or ever feel 
stressed about.  Like I said, it’s an education, and I don’t believe learning should 
ever be rushed.  If you can spread out your research over time, and be well-
organized in your pursuit, than the overall experience will be that much more 
fulfilling. 
 If you find early on in your process that this is not a topic you will be 
interested in, stop.  It is not worth your time and effort to spend over a year on 
something you don’t care about; you aren’t passionate about it.  You need to own 
what you’re doing.  If you can own your work and truly absorb yourself in the 
research it’ll almost become a sort of hobby for you to be an expert on a topic.  
You’ll find yourself talking to other people about it and genuinely being 
interested in your own work.   
 I promise you that if you give yourself plenty of time, work on capstone 
diligently, and dive into your research, that you will be rewarded in the end.  
When you have finally finished, it’s an incredibly satisfying experience.  
Whatever your topic, or however many words you write, is not what matters.  
What matters is that you stuck it out and finished.  While many are tempted to 
ix 
back out of the honors program by their senior year to avoid writing a thesis, the 
ones that do stick with it and graduate with honors are the ones standing tall and 
proud in the end.  Good luck with your research and pick a topic you will really 
be interested in learning more about.  I knew very little about the pharmaceutical 
industry when I began, and by the end I was checking the stock tickers of many of 
the companies I had researched on a daily basis. 
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PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: WHEN A MONOPOLY BECOMES 
EXPOSED 
 
The constant need for new drugs would not be present if it weren’t for the 
limited life of patents.  Patents in the U.S. and the rest of the world expire after 20 
years.  The life of one patent, covering an approved pharmaceutical product 
containing a new drug, may be extended by up to five years in the U.S., Europe, 
and Japan to make up for time lost in obtaining approval for marketing (Voet, 
2008).  While patents reward companies for their development of new drugs, the 
reward is limited.  Patents prevent pharmaceutical companies from having an 
infinite stream of revenue from a single blockbuster drug.  This time stamp forces 
pharmaceutical companies to constantly innovate, planning for their future when 
their current patented drug or drugs have reached their expiration date.   
Martin A. Voet, Senior Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property 
Counsel for a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company, describes a patent as a ‘legal 
monopoly,’ in his book The Generic Challenge: Understanding Patents, FDA & 
Pharmaceutical Life-Cycle Management.  As Voet (2008) clarifies, “a patent is a 
governmental grant that provides the holder for a limited period of time the 
exclusive right to prevent others from making, using or selling the patented 
product or process in exchange for his disclosure of the invention to the public.”  
Certainly the most important aspect to patent law is its 20 years of limited life.  In 
2011, Pfizer will be forced to replace the lost sales of Lipitor, when it runs out of 
patent protection.  Lipitor was by far the world’s biggest selling drug in 2008, 
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with global sales of $13.7 billion (representing 31% of all Pfizer’s 2008 global 
sales).  However, in 2011, those sales will start declining, and potentially at a 
rapid pace.  Once patents for drugs, such as Lipitor, run off, generics rush in to 
steal market share, and they do so at a cheaper price.   
 Generic companies have no expense for discovery, development, or 
marketing of drugs.  They are legally allowed to copy an innovator’s drug after a 
short time of exclusivity for the innovator, unless there is patent protection, in 
which they must wait for that protection to run out.  If they can overcome the 
patent protection, they can legally obtain rights to use all the safety and efficacy 
data developed by the innovator and copy the drug (Voet, 2008).  If generics are 
so much cheaper to develop and deliver, than why hasn’t ‘big pharma’ taken this 
strategy over blockbusters?   Well, in fact, many have, and we can particularly see 
this trend in foreign companies, most notably Teva Pharmaceuticals.  The 
emergence of this Israeli company, who was ranked 17th in global pharmaceutical 
sales in 2008, along with the growing power of other generic companies, poses an 
increasing threat to established pharmaceutical companies (Gassmann, 
Reepmeyer, & Zedtwitz, 2008).  It has been made quite public that companies 
such as Pfizer, along with Merck, and Schering-Plough have been heavily reliant 
on blockbuster revenues in recent years and are now facing patent expiration and 
maturing drug portfolios.  It will be interesting to see the effect that patent 
expiration has on these ‘big pharma’ companies in then near future.  In late 2009 
we already saw one reaction to this anticipation of declining sales, as Pfizer 
acquired Wyeth, 10th in 2008 global pharmaceutical sales, and owners of three big 
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blockbuster drugs: Effexor, Prevnar, and Enbrel, which had combined sales of 
$9.2 billion in 2008.     
 As patent life wears off, companies such as Pfizer must have new drugs in 
development and ready to enter market.  As I mentioned earlier, time is money.  
While this phrase is cliché, it truly is the name of the game in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  In the 2008 book Leading Pharmaceutical Innovation: Trends and 
Drivers for Growth in the Pharmaceutical Industry, the authors suggest that time-
to-market is extremely important in breakthrough pharmaceuticals, because “the 
first in the market captures between 40 to 60 percent of the market, and the 
second only around 1 percent.  Coming in third already means a negative 
business” (Gassmann et al., 2008).  Not only do these firms need to have a 
constant pipeline of new drug development, but they need to be faster and more 
efficient in developing the drugs than the next firm.  They need superior R&D to 
be a superior pharmaceutical company.  Without R&D, innovation is not possible, 
and without constant innovation, pharmaceutical companies cannot survive.   
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THE IMPORTANCE OF R&D IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
 Research and development is the all important sector of the 
pharmaceutical industry that discovers and drives news drugs to market; fueling 
innovation.  However, R&D is a very delicate area, and truly the one division of a 
pharmaceutical company that can make or break its fate.  The discovery of just 
one new drug can transform an unknown pharmaceutical company to being a 
major player overnight.  In the case of Lipitor, we can see the tremendous impact 
just one new blockbuster drug can have on a company’s sales.  However, in order 
to grow and maintain sustainability in the future, this pipeline of new drugs must 
continue; it must be constant.  The failure of a newly developed substance during 
the R&D process causes significant losses.  Thus, the attrition rates in drug 
development expose pharmaceutical companies to tremendous risks.  In fact, even 
the slightest bit of adverse news about a new compound in development can cause 
share prices of pharmaceutical companies to plummet, literally erasing several 
billions of dollars in shareholder value within minutes (Gassmann et al., 2008).  
With such significant risks in R&D, and the pressure on successful drug 
development, no company is completely safe.  However, the bigger companies 
diversify themselves to reduce such risk. Whether it is in the place of mergers and 
acquisitions to enhance a company’s drug catalog or the outsourcing and 
diversification of R&D to increase rate and opportunity of new drug discovery, 
firms understand the tremendous importance of R&D, and take strategic measures 
to reduce risk and enhance the success rate of new drug discovery.  
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 To help support the importance of R&D to innovation, and thus new drug 
development, I will draw from an article entitled “Corporate Governance and the 
Governance of Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceutical Industry,” written by 
Nicola Lacetera in the Journal of Management & Governance in 2001.  Lacetera 
(2001) confirms that many studies have shown a strong relationship between 
R&D and innovative performance in pharmaceuticals and other science-based 
firms.  R&D is so vital that a significant percent of the profits made by drug 
companies in marketing and selling their current drugs is plowed right back into 
research to discover and develop future drugs.  Martin A. Voet (2008) 
summarizes this cycle precisely as, “no profits on current drugs, no research on 
future drugs.”  It is important to think of R&D in such a cyclical manner, because 
the purpose of R&D is for future innovation, and this cannot be funded without a 
firm’s current products, which were once drugs in the developmental stage of a 
research lab as well.    
 Let’s take another example from ‘big pharma.’  The CEO of Roche 
Holding AG, Severin Schwan, said in a December, 2008 interview with the Wall 
Street Journal, “Those who fail to bring sufficient innovation will be squeezed 
out of this market” (Whalen).  To that end, Roche has begun to boost its R&D 
spending as a percentage of its sales in order to spur necessary drug development 
(Whalen, 2008).  In 2008 Roche spent $7.2 billion on R&D, which accounted for 
roughly 34% of its 2008 global pharmaceutical sales.  This was a $500 million 
increase from 2007 when Roche spent $6.7 billion on R&D (33% of sales).  
Roche, whose 2008 sales ranked 8th amongst global pharmaceutical companies, 
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has taken the initiative to spark more innovation in its company through R&D 
expenses.  The authors of Leading Pharmaceutical Innovation, agree with 
Schwan’s opinion on the current state of the industry, as they believe there is need 
for increased innovation as well.  According to this source, “pharmaceutical 
innovation and the number of new products will have to increase in order to 
sustain growth” (Gassmann et al., 2008).  Gassmann et al. (2008) are also in 
agreement with my previous statements on the need for a continuous flow of new 
drugs when they state that “the drug development pipeline is the engine that 
drives pharmaceutical companies.”   
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OPEN INNOVATION AND EXTERNALIZATION OF R&D 
 
Since R&D is so vital to the pharmaceutical industry, and it can be such a 
risky process, diversification is a necessity.  Along with the delicacy of 
developing new drugs, costs of R&D are rising rapidly, driven by larger and more 
complex clinical studies and expensive new enabling technologies (Gassmann et 
al., 2008).  Through my research I have found that firms are reacting to these 
factors in a multitude of ways.  Two strategies that are practiced commonly in the 
industry are (1) open innovation, such as mergers or acquisitions, and (2) 
externalizing R&D, such as tapping into government sponsored research at 
universities.  The dramatic rise of biotechnology firms can fill both of these 
strategies as pharmaceutical companies can acquire or partner with them or create 
an alliance to outsource R&D to them.  For the relevance of my study however, I 
am most concerned with how pharmaceutical companies tap into research at 
universities.  However, open innovation is also extremely relevant to this business 
model, since mergers and acquisitions increase and diversify a company’s 
resources, and in particular, can increase its university connections for research.   
 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers are a strategic move for pharmaceutical companies because they 
exploit synergy effects, resulting in the reduction of costs in administration, sales, 
and development.  They also allow for access to new markets and industry 
subsectors (Gassmann et al., 2008).  Mergers and acquisitions increase a 
company’s drug catalog on the market and in development.  With more internal 
8 
and external research resources available, companies can reduce risk and 
hopefully increase their production of new drugs.   
The case of Pfizer is once again most relevant to this topic of open 
innovation as it is the most recent ‘big pharma’ company to make a blockbuster 
acquisition.  A January, 2009 article in The Economist, highlights the case of 
Pfizer, taking over Wyeth, as “cement[ing] its position as the world’s leading 
drugmaker” (“Taking something”).  Pfizer, as the article reports, felt the need to 
make a move during tough economic times as its blockbuster drug Lipitor is set to 
go off patent in 2011.  Its pipeline was not flowing at the rate necessary to plug 
such a gap.  Acquiring Wyeth provides Pfizer with “some protection, as costs 
could be cut by bringing together research budgets and by reducing vast 
overlapping marketing operations of the two firms.  Wyeth also contained a cash-
generating vaccines business and useful biotech expertise, an area where Pfizer 
had few products” (“Taking something,” 2009).  In another January, 2009 article 
in The Economist, Charles Farkas of Bain, a consultancy, adds that the deal is a 
useful “half step” forward for Pfizer.  While Farkas (2009) believes that Wyeth’s 
assets will buy it some time, it won’t be enough to replenish the research pipeline 
or to replace Lipitor (“Buying Time”).  Ultimately, we get the indication that 
while Pfizer needed to make a move, the acquisition of Wyeth was simply a short 
term solution to satisfy its shareholders.  In an age when new drug development is 
declining and innovation is hard to come by in the pharmaceutical industry, a loss 
of a drug such a Lipitor may be irreplaceable no matter what kind of open 
innovation measures Pfizer takes. 
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Big deals such as Pfizer’s have been scrutinized by Michael Rainey of 
Accenture, who has reached the conclusion that “nine out of ten deals created no 
value or negative value” (“Buying Time,” 2009).  David Brennan, CEO of 
AstraZeneca adds that “if big efficiency improvements were really possible, good 
managers would do them anyway, rather than pursuing mergers” (“Buying Time,” 
2009).  Even amongst research there appears to be no connection between size 
and success, and if anything, says this article from The Economist, “larding on 
extra layers of research managers stifles the entrepreneurial spirit that makes 
nimble biotechnology firms successful” (“Buying Time,” 2009).  Sometimes 
bigger is not better, and especially in the case of the pharmaceutical industry, 
expanding research capabilities so greatly, can really hinder the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the company, as The Economist article suggests, having adverse effects 
on innovation. 
Thus, strategic alliances rather than ‘set-in-stone’ mergers or acquisitions 
may be a smarter practice for pharmaceutical companies today.  Relating back to 
the article “Corporate Governance and the Governance of Innovation: The Case 
of the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Nicola Lacetera focuses on organizational 
dynamics that have characterized the pharmaceutical industry.  Lacetera (2001) 
speaks to research that has shown alliances to work better than mergers and 
acquisitions.  This is most likely due to the flexibility and multidimensionality of 
such deals (Lacetera, 2001).  Alliances can be formed in many ways, whether it is 
through biotechnology firms as Lacetera (2009) focuses on, or for the case of my 
10 
study, academic institutions.  Regardless, of who the alliance is with, it provides a 
platform for a pharmaceutical firm to externalize a portion of its R&D.   
 
Externalizing R&D 
 
 While industry giants often merge with or acquire other firms, a common 
practice in virtually all firms is to externalize or outsource R&D.  Outsourcing 
represents the “loosest” form of cooperation between a pharmaceutical company 
and its partner firm.  The rationale behind outsourcing usually refers to the ability 
to optimize resources used in internal R&D (Gassmann et al., 2008).  Once again, 
this speaks to diversification and reduction of risk in R&D.  Gassmann et al. 
(2008) have identified the primary drivers for outsourcing R&D to include 
reduction of over capacities, cost cutting or restructuring issues, growth 
aspirations, reduction of risk (proactive risk management), and corporate 
governance (strategic make-or-by decisions).  The last driver for externalization 
of R&D is most relevant to my study and I will dig further into the relationship 
between corporate governance and strategic R&D resources in the next section.   
 While externalization for many U.S. firms may consist primarily of 
utilizing research at biotechnology companies or academic institutions, there has 
been a trend amongst many international firms to outsource their research 
operations to foreign countries. According to Marcia Angell, M.D., in her 2004 
book The Truth About the Drug Companies, some European companies are now 
locating their R&D operations in the United States.  “They claim it is because we 
don’t regulate prices, as foes much of the rest of the world.  But more likely it is 
because they want to feed on the unparalleled research output of American 
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universities and the NIH.  In other words it’s not private enterprise that draws 
them here but her very opposite, our publicly sponsored research enterprise” 
(Angell, 2004).  Even despite the recent global recession, Op-Ed Columnist for 
The New York Times, David Brooks (2009) confirms that “The U.S. remains the 
world’s most competitive economy, the leader in information technology, 
biotechnology and nearly every cutting-edge sector.”  Thus, it is simply smart 
business practice for international pharmaceutical firms to tap into America’s 
hotbed of innovation.  Specifically, Gassmann et al. (2008) say that the pioneers 
of R&D internationalization are high-tech companies operating in small markets 
and with little R&D resources in their home country.   
 This further leads to my initial argument that having university 
connections on pharmaceutical boards makes a difference:   
Hypothesis 1: Geographic location impacts the need for outsourced/external 
R&D, and thus I believe smaller European companies, with fewer resources in 
their home countries, will have a greater need for university connections, and this 
will be reflected on their boards.  
After all, Elan Corp (Ireland), Novartis (Switzerland), and Novo Nordisk 
(Denmark), must all have a reason for having American university connections on 
their boards.  These companies are based in relatively small countries, with 
limited resources, and thus the United States would reign supreme for their 
externalized R&D operations.  Of the 24 international companies in my sample of 
109 pharmaceutical companies, 11 of the 24 companies have university 
connections on their boards.  However this figure is much more revealing when 
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broken down, as it is greatly skewed by Canadian companies.  In fact, of the 11 
Canadian companies in my sample only Bioniche Life Sciences had university 
representation on its board, while the other 10 had zero university connections on 
their boards.  I could only hypothesize that since Canada, with its close proximity 
and easy access to the United States, as well as being a NAFTA member, it is 
quite easy for these companies to tap into American research without the need for 
university representation on their boards.  Of the 24 international companies, 10 
were European.  Alarmingly, 9/10 European companies in my sample had 
university connections on their boards.  While this sample is quite small, 90% of 
the European companies I researched had university connections on their boards, 
while only 51% of American companies did (43/85).  This would further support 
my argument, and the overlying trend found in my literature review, that 
pharmaceutical companies from smaller markets need to gain access to the 
tremendous disposal of research in America in order to compete.  They can 
therefore gain these connections or strategic alliances, if you will, through 
university connections on their boards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: INNOVATION IN ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
According to the Pharmaceutical Executive magazines “The Pharm Exec 
50,” a list of the top 50 pharmaceutical companies in the world based on the 
companies’ own reported sales, taken from SEC filing and annual reports, in 
2008, the top 10 pharmaceutical companies on that list were: Pfizer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis, Novartis, AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson, 
Merck, Roche, Eli Lilly, and Wyeth.  While this group of industry giants is 
diverse in the blockbuster drugs they sell and the countries they find headquarters 
in, one thing they do have in common is a consistent component of their corporate 
governance.  The boards for all 10 of these ‘big pharma’ companies have at least 
one university connection, and on average 2.6 university connections (26/118, or 
22%, of the directors in top 10 ‘big pharma’ companies’ boards are university 
employees).  So are these directors simply filling leadership positions in their 
respective companies, chosen for their expertise in medicine, biology, business, 
etc.?  Or, as I have labeled it, are these directors being utilized as a connection?  
Whether or not the universities they represent are or are not an intentional basis 
for their election as board members, the more important question for the purpose 
of this study is: does it matter?   
Hypothesis 2A:  Having university representation on a pharmaceutical 
company’s board, enables that company to create a strategic alliance with the 
university that director is representing.  This alliance is strengthened by the 
director’s ability to represent both parties and act as a liaison between the firm 
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and the university; helping to maintain consistent communication, ensuring that 
the firm and universities’ strategies and expectations are synergized.   
Hypotheses 2B: The decision to make a university employee a board member can 
also be seen as an all important political and prestigious affiliation, giving a 
member of the university the power to influence corporate decision making on a 
governance level.   
The problem facing the industry today, and its darkest secret, is that the 
stream of new drugs has slowed to a trickle, and very few of them are innovative 
in any sense of that word (Angell, 2004).  Due to this fact, ‘big pharma’ is 
depending on the government, universities, and small biotech companies for that 
innovation (Angell, 2004).  Tapping into government sponsored research in 
academic institutions wasn’t even a possibility until 1980.  The Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 enabled universities and small businesses to patent discoveries emanating 
from research sponsored by the National Institute of Health, the major contributor 
of tax dollars for medical research, and then to grant exclusive licenses to drug 
companies.  When a patent held by a university or a small biotech company is 
eventually licensed to a big drug company, all parties cash in on the public 
investment in research (Angell, 2004).  The key here is that all parties benefit.  
The article “University-industry collaboration: Grafting the 
entrepreneurial paradigm onto academic structures,” published for the European 
Journal of Innovation Management in 2007, highlights such partnership.  The 
article notes that in order for collaboration to be successful, there are two key 
measures of innovative development that drive knowledge exchange between 
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university research centers and industry: (1) the rate of knowledge development; 
and (2) the speed of knowledge transfer and exploitation (Dooley & Kirk, 2007). 
Effective collaboration, according to Dooley & Kirk (2007), “occurs where 
partner organizations possess synergistic goals and the complementary assets to 
facilitate achievement of these goals. It is also nurtured where the consortium 
develops structures and relationship based control systems that encourage 
knowledge exchange.” Thus, in this way, the participating university and 
pharmaceutical company can both benefit from this collaboration and both 
enhance their long-term sustainability and innovative outputs (Dooley & Kirk, 
2007).  Certainly, such synergy of goals would be more easily facilitated through 
closer connection and communication between firm and university.  By having a 
member of the partnered university on its board, a pharmaceutical company is 
able to more easily communicate its research strategy and expectations to the 
university.  This board member can act as a liaison, if you will, between the 
university and firm; a strategic alliance cemented in its very corporate 
governance; a university connection who also has the power to influence key 
corporate decisions.   
Lacetera (2001) speaks to pharmaceutical alliances with biotechnology 
firms, and how external agents from these firms can be “called to participate in 
the organization of central activities of a firm, and may thus affect its strategy and 
performance.”  Similarly to alliances with biotech firms, external ‘agents’ from 
academic institutions can also be utilized in the decision making process central to 
the pharmaceutical company the agents’ university is aligned with.  It is a way for 
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a pharmaceutical firm to say to the university, “we value you as a partner and we 
want you to have a say in our company’s decision making process.”  Therefore, 
by placing a member of that university on its board of directors, the university can 
have a direct or indirect influence on the company’s decision making.  It also 
instills confidence in the university over the security and longevity of their 
partnership with that company in the R&D of new drugs. 
In publicly owned companies, which all of these pharmaceutical 
companies are, directors are not merely advisers.  They are selected to represent 
the interests of the shareholders, and as a result, they require certain attributes 
beyond just bringing some competence to the board (Colley, Doyle, Logan, & 
Stettinius, 2005).  Colley et al. (2005), authors of the McGraw-Hill series text 
What Is Corporate Governance? note that “the relative effectiveness of corporate 
governance has a profound effect on how well a business performs.”  Thus while 
some critics may call their positioning on the pharmaceutical boards as 
‘figureheads,’ or put in place for strictly political reasons, it is important to look at 
all sides of the matter.  Certainly their expertise in the medical field, or other 
professional field can be very beneficial to the board, and the company.  After all, 
“the aim of a corporate board is to have a breadth of expertise in order to deal 
effectively with the issues confronting the business (Colley et al., 2005).  
Therefore, while businessmen and women are incredibly important in advising the 
company, there is also a need for medical and related expertise.  If a medical 
professor from Harvard University provides such expertise and guidance, then 
why would some companies feel the need to have three or four professors on their 
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boards?  Well, for the very reason that is the route of my argument.  Yes, these 
board members do serve a traditional corporate governance function, representing 
the shareholders, bringing competence to the board, and offering specific 
expertise, but there is also a very strategic reasoning behind their selection.  They 
aren’t just any medical expert or accounting expert.  They represent a university, 
and most often a high ranking university, particularly in the medical field.  They 
are a bridge between that university and the company they are serving on, and 
thus their placement is not only strategic by the company who elects them, but 
smart.   
 Today, universities are under increased pressure from government and 
industry to engage more actively in the innovation process, which is resulting in 
closer links between universities and pharmaceutical firms (Dooley & Kirk, 
2007).  Whether you call them a link or a liaison, as I have, these university 
employees elected to pharmaceutical boards have a distinct purpose beyond their 
standard duties as board members.  They assume the obligation to represent the 
interests of the pharmaceutical companies’ owners who cannot represent 
themselves, undertaking a serious fiduciary responsibility (Colley et al., 2005), 
and I believe they also must assume the responsibility of representing their 
respective universities on that board.  As I have mentioned, both parties benefit 
from university-industry collaboration.  A Harvard professor serving on Johnson 
& Johnson’s board can be a tremendous asset not only to Johnson & Johnson, but 
to Harvard as well. 
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Thanks to the Bayh-Dole Act, drug companies no longer have to rely on 
their own research for new drugs, and few of the large ones do.  As Angell (2004) 
notes, “increasingly they rely on academia, small biotech start-up companies, and 
the NIH for that.”  The importance and effectiveness of this collaboration can be 
highlighted by Angell’s (2004) statistic that at least a third of drugs marketed by 
the major drug companies are now licensed from universities or small biotech 
companies, and these tend to be the most innovative ones. 
With the 1980 Bayh-Dole legislation, the traditional boundaries between 
academia and industry were blurred.  Academic medical centers now saw 
themselves as “partners” of the pharmaceutical industry in common endeavors.  
Consider the case of Harvard: The Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, a Harvard 
hospital, has a deal that gives Novartis rights to discoveries that lead to new 
cancer drugs.  Another example is Merck, who has built a twelve-story research 
facility next door to Harvard Medical School (Angell, 2004).  One of 12 directors 
on Novartis’s board is Strikant Datar, Ph.D., a Senior Associate Dean at Harvard 
University.  Not surprisingly Harvard is also represented on Merck’s board of 
directors by Samuel O. Thier, M.D, a professor at the Harvard Medical School.  
Harvard is by far the most commonly represented university of the 
pharmaceutical boards I researched, showing up 10 times in a sample of 109 
companies, meaning that roughly 1 in every 11 companies in my sample had a 
Harvard University employee on their board; a Harvard University connection.  
However, as I discovered in my research, and which is also noted by Marcia 
Angell, M.D., Harvard is not unique.  One recent survey showed that two-thirds 
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of academic medical centers hold equity in start-up companies that sponsor some 
research.  “The drug companies for their part are generous to the medical 
schools,” says Angell (2004).  In Harvard Medical School’s Dean’s Report for 
2003-04, for instance, the list of benefactors included about a dozen of the largest 
drug companies (Angell, 2004).   Of the 10 pharmaceutical companies I found to 
have Harvard representatives on their boards, they included the mentioned 
Novartis, Merck, as well as ‘big pharma’ companies Bristol-Myers Squbb, Eli-
Lilly, Pfizer, and Teva.  We soon begin to see an early indication of a strong 
relationship between big pharmaceutical companies and elite academic 
institutions.  Not surprisingly, Harvard was ranked #1 in the Academic Ranking 
of World Universities (ARWU), published by the Center for World-Class 
Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University.  Harvard was also ranked first in ARWU’s list of top 100 ‘Clinical 
Medicine and Pharmacy’ ranking (www.arwu.org).  The big companies clearly 
see an importance of not only having university relations on their boards, but top 
university relations.  They want research connections at the very best universities. 
While the benefit of university-industry relations in the pharmaceutical industry 
appears to be two-way, there is evidence that perhaps the relationship is going too 
far.  In a January, 2010 New York Times article entitled “Outside Pay Restrictions 
Imposed By Harvard Research Hospitals” it was reported in a front page story 
that  "The owner of two research hospitals affiliated with the Harvard Medical 
School has imposed restrictions on outside pay for two dozen senior officials who 
also sit on the boards of pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies. The limits 
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come in the wake of growing criticism of the ties between industry and academia" 
(Wilson).  The rules being imposed would put limits specifically on “outside 
directors who guide some of the nation’s biggest companies” (Wilson, 2010).  
Senior officials at Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s Hospitals in 
Boston will be forced to limit their pay for serving as outside directors to no more 
than $5,000 a day for actual work on the board.  The article had sited that some of 
the directors from academic institutions were receiving up to $200,00 a year.  
They will also no longer be able to accept stock from their respective 
pharmaceutical companies while still employed at the university (Wilson, 2010).  
This brings into question an important point.  Is the industry going too far?  Or is 
it the industry’s fault at all?  Maybe the blame should be placed more towards the 
directors who appear to be making too much of a priority for their director roles 
over their academic positions.  But I say, can you really blame them?  With the 
money these pharmaceutical companies are offering outside directors from 
academic institutions, it is no wonder that they find their positions on their boards 
as extremely important.  Pharmaceutical companies clearly see an advantage in 
having these board members, and while schools such as Harvard may be feeling 
threatened that industry is taking time away from their employees, ultimately, I 
believe that the benefits of industry-university collaboration in pharmaceuticals 
are two-fold.  Industry benefits from university research, and universities benefit 
through industry plowing money back into their facilities.  
The few innovative drugs that do come to market nearly always stem from 
publicly supported research.  In this country, almost all of that is sponsored by the 
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NIH and carried out at universities, small biotechnology companies, or the NIH 
itself.  About 90 percent of NIH-sponsored research is done mainly at medical 
schools and teaching hospitals (Angell, 2004). 
Major pharmaceutical companies are showing increased interest in directly 
sponsoring academic research to access innovation and fill dwindling pipelines.  
Factors influencing these academic-industry collaborations, according to a 2009 
Drug Week magazine article, include not only the dwindling pipelines, but 
historical relationships, as well as diminishing federal funding for academia 
(“Research and Markets”).  Notable collaborators that this Drug Week article 
highlight, that I have also researched for my study, include: AstraZeneca, who has 
four university connections on its board (University of Manchester, University of 
Cincinnati, Huddinge University, and the Karolinska Institute); GlaxoSmithKline, 
who is connected to Imperial College, London and the University of Texas 
Southwestern through its board; Merck, who has three university connections on 
its board (Vanderbilt University, University of Pennsylvania, and Harvard 
University); Novartis, who is connected to Harvard University through its board; 
and Pfizer, who has four university connections on its board (Harvard Medical 
School, University of Texas Southwestern, New York University, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology).  As mentioned, these university 
connections are marked by board directors whose primary place of employment is 
at that of their respective academic institution.  Thus, Dennis A. Ausiello, a 
professor at Harvard Medical School, and a Pfizer board member, is marked as a 
Harvard University connection for Pfizer through its board of directors.   It is 
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interesting to note that Lacetera (2001) believed in her study that an analysis of 
the relationship between scientist participation on the board and links with 
universities and other basic research institutions could be another interesting 
study, which is quite similar to the study I have conducted here. 
 The following hypotheses, while related to my literature review, directly 
relate to the research study I conducted and the data gathered during that research.  
These hypotheses predict the results of the regression models I ran which look for 
relationships between board characteristics, particularly university representation, 
company size, performance, and other firm-level variables.   
 
Hypothesis 3A: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more women on its 
board.  
Hypothesis 3B: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more insiders on its 
board. 
Hypothesis 3C: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more likely the 
chairman of the board is also the CEO. 
 Hypothesis 3A is based on the initial trend I observed while examining 
pharmaceutical boards.  Larger, more prominent companies had larger boards, 
often with at least one female representation, while smaller companies with 
smaller boards rarely had such representation.  It is easier to be diverse in a larger 
company where there are more employees and larger boards in charge of key 
decision making processes.  Thus, I believe such diversity is more apparent in 
larger pharmaceutical companies.  The suggestion that insiders will be more 
prominent in larger companies’ boards is based on the ideology that larger 
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companies will have more qualified and impressive individuals in key leadership 
roles (i.e. CEO, CFO), and these individuals will also take part in their 
companies’ corporate governance practices within the board of directors.  The 
same ideology can be applied for the CEO also charring his or her company’s 
board in larger pharmaceutical companies. 
Hypothesis 4A: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more university 
employees it will have on its board and the greater percentage of their boards will 
be made up of university employees. 
Hypothesis 4B: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more quality 
universities its university representatives will be from on its board. 
Hypothesis 4C: The larger the pharmaceutical company, the more top-100 
ranked medical schools will be represented on its board. 
Hypothesis 4D: S&P 500 pharmaceutical companies are more likely to have 
university connections on their boards (connects to 4a.) 
 It is my belief that larger pharmaceutical companies will have more 
university connections and this will therefore be represented on their boards.  
Larger pharmaceutical companies will also naturally be able to connect and 
partner with leading universities in medical schools more easily than with smaller, 
lesser developed firms who have less capital to spend on R&D expenses to foster 
innovation.  Finally, I believe that foreign pharmaceutical companies are more 
likely to utilize university employees on their boards than domestic companies 
because they have fewer resources in their home countries.  With S&P companies 
representing American firms, and particularly the larger American firms, these 
24 
pharmaceutical companies will have the greatest advantage in gaining university 
connections, by tapping in to American resources at leading American Medical 
Schools and through the NIH, and this will therefore be represented on their 
boards. 
Hypothesis 5A: The more women on a board, the better the pharmaceutical 
company’s performance. 
Hypothesis 5B: The more insiders on a board, the better the pharmaceutical 
company’s performance. 
Hypothesis 5C: Pharmaceutical companies whose chairman is also the CEO 
perform better than companies whose chairman is not the CEO. 
 I believe that there is a direct correlation between gender diversity in a 
company and that company’s performance.  The same should be said for 
corporate governance, as increased female representation will foster more 
innovative ideas and thus greater performance for that company.  I believe the 
same can be said for insider representation on pharmaceutical companies’ boards 
as the more insiders, the more aligned the board will be with the upper 
management of that company.  This alignment and synergy of communication can 
be greatly enhanced when the CEO also chairs the board, and thus the same 
person oversees the company as a whole and its corporate governance. 
Hypothesis 6A: The more university employees on a board and the greater 
percentage of the boards that are made up of university employees, the better the 
pharmaceutical company’s performance, the greater the R&D expense. 
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Hypothesis 6B: The higher total quality university connections on a 
pharmaceutical board, the better the company’s performance, the greater the 
R&D expense/ 
Hypothesis 6C: The more top-100 ranked medical schools represented on a 
pharmaceutical company’s board, the better the company’s performance, the 
greater the R&D expense. 
Hypothesis 6D: Despite having more university connections on their boards, 
foreign pharmaceutical companies will not outperform American pharmaceutical 
companies because they are at a disadvantage due to limited resources in their 
home country.  
 In conjunction with Hypothesis 2, I believe pharmaceutical companies 
greatly benefit from having university representatives on their boards, and this 
will therefore be reflected in those companies’ performance.  Greater university 
connections also imply that these companies are also investing more in R&D.  If a 
company is connected with a number of universities and can be visibly 
represented through investments in those schools (such as building of research 
labs) along with having employees from those schools acting as directors on the 
company’s board, it is quite clear that the company is making significant 
investments in R&D via academic research.  I also believe that the level or quality 
of university research matters.  A company will benefit from having university 
connections but it will benefit more if these connections are top level international 
universities and medical schools.  Therefore, I hypothesize that the level of 
performance and R&D expenses will increase as the institutions’ ranking 
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increases.  Finally, I believe, while foreign firms will have to make up for lack of 
domestic resources in their home countries to compete with American firms, their 
increased use of university connections on their boards will not make up for their 
geographic disadvantages associated with their R&D pipelines.    
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METHODS 
Sample 
 Using COMPUSTAT data from Wharton Research Data Services, I used 
the SIC Code of 2834, Pharmaceutical Preparations, to extract data on the 
industry.  Of the 222 companies, I eliminated all companies that did not have 
complete data for Assets, Sales, R&D Expense, and Employees for the five-year 
period of 2004-2008.  I also eliminated a select few of small companies that did 
not offer sufficient information on their board of directors on their respective 
corporate websites.  I eventually arrived at 109 pharmaceutical companies that 
had complete data necessary for the study.  These companies’ boards were then 
researched one-by-one noting the characteristics of board size, gender breakdown, 
insiders vs. outsiders, if the chairman is/isn’t the CEO,  university members 
(medical and non-medical), committee memberships of these university members, 
and the proportion of university members on the boards.  Profiles were created for 
all board directors who were presently employed by universities.  In my database 
I have a total of 99 director profiles who are employed by a university (see 
Appendix B for Pfizer’s director profiles).  If a director was a retired university 
professor, for example, I did not include that member as having an active 
affiliation.  All of my data was collected in 2009 and the results and conclusions 
contained in the study are subject to change in subsequent years.  Since I was 
using 2009 board data, I eliminated Wyeth and Schering-Plough from the sample 
as they have been acquired or merged in the past year; no longer being traded as 
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S&P 500 companies under their own ticker (This decreased my dataset of 
companies from 111 to 109).  
 All board-level data, as mentioned was extracted in the year 2009.  
However, all firm-level data is from the year 2008.  2008 was the most recent, 
complete firm-level data that could be extracted, while the time period of 
individual pharmaceutical board research was done during the latter part of 2009. 
Ideally we would have liked to have firm-level data and board-level data from the 
same year; however, it would not have been realistic to have extracted board data 
for all of the pharmaceutical companies in the dataset from the previous year.  
Companies display their most recent board profiles on their corporate websites 
and thus identifying all of the changes from 2008 to 2009 in board profiles would 
have been unrealistic, yielding mostly null data.  We can justify that the 
relationships between firm and board-level variables will not change significantly 
over one years’ time as corporate strategy in terms of board makeup and director 
goals towards the companies’ vision and direction are more long-term minded.  
The large majority of board members that were on these companies’ boards in 
2009 were there in 2008, as the directors of boards are changed infrequently, and 
on a one-by-one basis.  Thus, board characteristics stay quite consistent, year-by-
year. 
 Firm-level data necessary for my study was extracted using company 
tickers.  Once I had compiled all of my data for the 109 companies, I broke it 
down by company, size, performance, board characteristics, and other data (i.e. 
R&D, geography, etc.).  Once the dataset was complete, and checked over 
29 
multiple times for accuracy, the data was moved to Minitab Statistical to begin 
statistical analysis.  My first step was to run basic descriptive statistics on all of 
the data.  This included finding the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, and median for all of the variables in the set.  This information 
allowed me to double check the data for accuracy, identifying any alarming 
outliers (min/max), and the spread and variation in data.   
 Next, I created box plots for all of the variables on Minitab.  The box plots 
enabled me to visually see the descriptive statistics of the data and easily identify 
outliers.  Once I could specifically spot outliers that were skewing my data, I 
performed logs and winsorsing techniques in order to reduce the effects of outliers 
that could impact the eventual regression results.  For the most part I chose to use 
the winsorising method in variables that I foresaw negative impacts of outliers in 
the dataset.  Winsorising allowed me to transform extreme values in my data by 
simply making the three highest values for a variable the same as the fourth 
highest value, and the three lowest values the same as the fourth lowest value.  
This reduced the effect of outliers, eliminating skewing of the data, and created a 
more accurate description of the firm-level data in this industry. 
 My initial group of hypotheses was set to perform simple regression.  For 
the most part I had hypothesized one-to-one relationships (i.e. the correlation 
between company size and the percent of women on a board, or the correlation 
between an S&P 500 company and performance).  Simple regressions were run 
on Minitab revealing all one-to-one relationships that I had previously 
hypothesized.  However, the number of simple regressions provided an inefficient 
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correlation representation of the data.  As well as being inefficient and difficult to 
summarize, the relationships tested in simple regression were unrealistic because 
they ignored the many moving parts of a company.  While size and board 
characteristics are variables of a pharmaceutical company, at the same time a 
company has performance metrics, a geographical location, R&D expenses, etc.  
Thus in order to illustrate the relationships more efficiently and to more 
realistically show the strength of such relationships, multiple regressions needed 
to be conducted.  The results of multiple regression including coefficients and 
strength of the relationships within each model can be seen in Appendix C.   
Measures: Dependent Variables  
Board characteristics and Performance 
Board-Level Dependent Variables 
% Women on Board – Mean = 0.09 (9%), Standard Deviation = 0.09.  
While I expected most companies would have at least one woman serving 
on its board, in fact, only 67/109 (61%) of the companies in the sample 
had at least one woman serving on its board.  Thus, an alarming 39% of 
the pharmaceutical companies in the sample had no female representation 
on their board of directors. 
% Insiders on Board – Mean = 0.17 (17%), Standard Deviation = 0.10.  
Typically a company will have at least one insider on its board, most often 
the CEO; and many of the companies in the sample had multiple insiders 
serving (1.4 on average).  While not traditionally consider insiders, I did 
include retired CEO’s serving on a companies’ board as insiders since 
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they were at one time ‘inside’ the key decision making process of the 
company and had greatly influenced the companies’ current state and 
vision.   
Chairman = CEO? – Mean = 0.35, Standard Deviation = 0.48.  Note that 
this was a coded variable, Yes = 1, No = 0.  Thus, the mean of 0.35 
indicates that more pharmaceutical companies in my sample had separate 
individuals serving as their CEO and Chairman of the board then both 
positions being held by the same individual.      
University-Medical Connections on Board – Mean = 0.63, Standard 
Deviation = 0.90. 46/109 (42%) of the companies in the sample utilized at 
least one medical-related university employee on its board.  These could 
be any university positions in the research or practicing fields of all 
medical, pharmaceutical, or related-sciences.  Pfizer has three University-
Medical Connections on its board: Dennis A. Ausiello, M.D. (Jackson 
Professor of Clinical Medicine, Harvard Medical School), Michael S. 
Brown, M.D. (Regental Professor, University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center at Dallas), and William C. Steere, Jr.(Director: NYU 
Medical Center). 
University-Other Connections on Board – Mean = 0.24, Standard 
Deviation = 0.53.  These are university connections that are not directly 
medical-related.  22/109 (20%) of the companies in the sample utilized 
non-medical university employees on their boards.  The employee may 
represent a university with a top medical school but his or her position is 
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not in the medical or a related field (i.e., Business professor, Chancellor, 
etc.).  For example, Pfizer has one University-Other connection on its 
board: Dana G. Mead, Ph.D. (Chairman: MIT). Dr. Mead does not hold a 
medical-related position at MIT, instead he holds a position of governance 
over the entire university.  
University-Total Connections on Board – Mean = 0.86, Standard 
Deviation 1.10.  This represents the total of University-Medical and 
University-Other connections.  Connections can be counted twice on 
board (two Harvard’s by two different employees), so that the total 
power/influence of the connections is accounted for.  All university 
connections accounted for only include current or active positions held.  
Retired university employees serving on a board or directors with past 
university-positions, but nor current, were not accounted for.  What is 
most notable about this variable is the standard deviation of 1.10, which 
indicates a significant amount of variance in the sample.  There is clearly a 
great difference in philosophy amongst companies in this industry 
regarding the utilization of university connections on their boards. 
% of Board University Employees – Mean = 0.09 (9%), Standard 
Deviation = 0.11.  The mean of this variable is skewed by smaller 
companies.  For example, 29% (4/14) of Pfizer’s board is made of 
university employees.  A higher percentage is quite common amongst the 
larger S&P 500 companies, while the trend for smaller, less developed 
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firms in the sample is that they are far less likely to have university 
connections on their boards compared to their ‘Big Pharma’ counterparts. 
University Ranking Total – Mean = 3.46, Standard Deviation = 4.89.  
This is a coded variable.  If a university represented on a board was ranked 
1-100 in the world, it received 5 points, 101-200 = 4 points, 201-300=3, 
301-400=2, and 401-500=1.  The higher total, the more ‘better’ university 
connections that company has on its board (total power/quality of 
university connections).  The rankings were taken from the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), published by the Center for 
World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University.  For example, Pfizer received 20 points on 
my scale for ‘university ranking total’: it received this total because it has 
four universities (Harvard, Texas Southwestern, NYU, MIT) represented 
on it board of directors that are ranked between one and 100 for ‘world 
universities.’  I can use this point system therefore to reflect the overall 
power of Pfizer’s university connections.  They not only have four 
connections, but they are internationally-elite university connections.     
Top 100 Medical Schools Represented – Mean = 0.58, Standard deviation 
= 0.94.  This is also a coded variable, in which a company receives one 
point for every top-100 med school represented on its board.  The rankings 
were taken from ARWU’s list of top 100 ‘Clinical Medicine and 
Pharmacy’ rankings.  For example, Pfizer receives four points, because it 
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has four top-100 medical schools represented on its board (the same four 
universities that were ranked in the top-100 for world universities).      
Firm-Level Dependent Variables  
Sales Growth – Mean = 1.03, Standard Deviation = 7.89.  The sales 
growth was calculated for the years of 2006-2008 by using net sales 
(revenue) of the companies.  This is a performance metric.   
Return on Assets (ROA) – Mean = -0.52, Standard Deviation = 1.28.  This 
is a performance metric that shows how profitable a company's assets are 
in generating revenue. 
Earnings per Share (EPS) Basic – Mean = -0.09, Standard Deviation = 
1.79. This is also a performance metric. 
Independent Variables – x’s 
Size, Geography, Index, R&D, Performance 
Board-Level Independent Variables 
 The board-level independent variables were all utilized to equal the 
control firm-level independent variables, with the three performance measures of 
(sales growth, ROA, and EPS) being tested for each equation model.  The 
following board characteristics were all used as board-level dependent variables 
in the multiple regression equations (described above): Percent of Women on 
Board, Percent of Insiders on Board, Chairman = CEO?, University-Medical 
Connections on Board, University-Other Connections on Board, University-Total 
Connections on Board, Percent of Board University Employees, University 
Ranking Total, and Top 100 Medical Schools Represented. 
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Firm-Level Independent Variables 
 Along with performance measures of sales growth, ROA, and EPS, that 
were also used as dependent variables in the equation models for multiple 
regressions when the dependent variable was a board characteristic; the firm-level 
independent variables below were utilized for all equation models despite the 
dependent variable.  These are the control variable: 
Size (log of assets) – Mean = 5.53, Standard Deviation = 2.69.  This is the 
main indicator I used for company size.  Assets are economic resources 
owned by a company, and thus a good indicator of a companies’ size. 
Geography (domestic vs. foreign) – Mean = 0.21, Standard Deviation = 
0.41. This variable is utilized to identify the behavior of companies in U.S. 
versus the rest of world.  This is a coded variable in which Domestic = 0 
and Foreign = 1.  In the sample there were 85 domestic companies, and 24 
international companies.  I would have liked a more balanced sample, but 
the majority of data available to me in the industry was for American-
based firms.  As mentioned previously, board characteristics for foreign 
companies were skewed by Canadian firms that did not have a large 
university presence on their boards.   
S&P 500 Companies – Mean = 0.10, Standard Deviation = 0.30.  The 
S&P 500 is an index of the prices of 500 large-cap common stocks 
actively traded in the U.S., representing the behavior of large U.S-based 
companies.  This is a coded variable in which S&P 500 companies = 1, 
and Non S&P 500 companies = 0.  There were 11 S&P 500 
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pharmaceutical companies in the sample (Abbott, Allergan, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Hospira, Johnson & Johnson, King, Eli Lilly, Merck, Mylan, 
Pfizer, and Watson) 
R&D Expense – Mean = 760 (million). Standard Deviation = 1975.  R&D 
expense in a company represents it’s an investment in innovation, the most 
important aspect of the pharmaceutical industry, and a key variable to this 
study.   
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RESULTS 
 After performing multiple regressions the results were grouped by the 
strength of the relationship found.  In Appendix C I have created regression tables 
for all multiple regression outputs.  The coefficient is either left alone or given a 
symbol.  The three symbols of †, *, and ** represent a weak relationship, medium 
relationship, or strong relationship respectively.  If the coefficient was not given a 
symbol, the p-value of the t-statistic for that variable was greater than 0.1 and 
therefore the relationship was not significant.  A weak relationship was 
characterized by a p-value < 0.1, a medium relationship had a p-value < 0.05, and 
a strong relationship had a p-value < 0.01.  R-squares were also provided to 
represent the level of predictability in the model; how strong the relationship was 
between the dependent variable and the predicting independent variables.    
I found there to be a strong relationship between company size and the 
percent of women on a board.  The trend is the larger the company, the greater the 
percentage of woman on a board.  This holds true to Hypothesis 3A.  
There is a weak relationship between R&D expense and sales growth and 
the percent of a board that will be made up of insiders.  The correlation indicates 
that a company with greater R&D expense, when ROA is used a performance 
metric, will have a greater percentage of insiders on its board.  It also indicates 
that companies with larger sales growth will have a greater percentage of insiders 
on their board. 
When the dependent variable was set as the board characteristic 
‘Chairman = CEO,’ logistic regression was used.  This was necessary since the 
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dependent variable was coded.  These regression equations were set up slightly 
different than the others.  With logistic regression the independent variables of 
total assets, geography, S&P 500, R&D (as percent of sales), and the performance 
metrics were set equal to Chairman = CEO; the only relevant relationship was a 
medium strength correlation with S&P 500 companies when the performance 
metrics were sales growth and EPS, and a weak relationship between S&P and 
Chairman=CEO when ROA was the performance metric in the logistic regression 
equation.  The results show that S&P 500 companies are more likely to have the 
same employee in both positions than non S&P 500 companies.  We can 
hypothesize that for high-level American pharmaceutical companies the CEO is a 
highly qualified, impressive individual that the company feels would be more than 
capable of charring its board of directors, and should be the chairman in order to 
have more control over the company’s decision making.  
The dataset shows there to be a weak relationship between company size 
and the number of medical university connections on a board, when sales growth 
is used as a performance metric, while there is a medium strength relationship 
between size and medical university connections on a board when ROA and EPS 
are used as performance metrics.  There is also a medium strength relationship 
between R&D expense of a company and the number of medical university 
connections on a board when sales growth and EPS are used as performance 
metrics, and a weak relationship when ROA is used as a performance metric.  To 
put it more plainly, the larger the company and the greater the R&D expense of 
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that company, the more medical university connections on its board, proving 
Hypothesis 4C true.. 
There is a weak relationship between S&P 500 companies and the number 
of ‘other’ (non-medical) university connections on a board when sales growth and 
ROA are used as performance metrics and a medium relationship when EPS is 
used to measure company performance.  S&P 500 companies will on average 
have more non-medical university connections on their boards.  This trend could 
be due to larger board sizes in S&P 500 companies and the need to have a wide 
range of expertise to oversee the broad scope of these firms. 
There is a medium strength relationship between company size and the 
total number of university connections on a board.  There is also a medium 
relationship between R&D expense and total university connections on a board 
when ROA is a performance metric, and there is a strong relationship between 
R&D expense and total university connections when sales growth and EPS are 
used as performance metrics.  The larger the company and the greater the R&D 
expense of a company, the more university connections it wall have on its board, 
proving Hypothesis 4A to be true.  
There is a weak relationship between R&D expense and the percent of a 
board that’s made up of university connections when sales growth and EPS are 
used as performance metrics.  While the relationship is not strong, it is relevant 
enough to say that the greater the R&D expense of a company the greater 
percentage of that company’s board will be made up of university connections, 
which was predicted in Hypothesis 6A. 
40 
There is a weak relationship between the size of a company and the power 
and quality of its university connections when sales growth is used as a 
performance metric.  There is a medium relationship between company size and 
the power and quality of its university connections when ROA and EPS are used 
as performance metrics.  There is a strong relationship between R&D expense and 
university ranking power and quality.  Thus, while size is a predictor of university 
connections, a company’s R&D expenses is a strong predictor; the greater the 
R&D expense, the more quality universities that company will be connected to, 
validating Hypothesis 6B. 
There is a weak relationship between company size and the number of top-
100 medical schools represented on a board when sales growth is used as a 
performance metric.  There is a medium relationship between company size and 
the number of elite medical school connections when ROA and EPS are used as 
performance metrics.  There is a strong relationship between R&D expense and 
the number of top-100 medical schools represented on a pharmaceutical 
company’s board.  Thus the larger the company and more importantly, the greater 
the R&D expense of that company, the more likely top-100 medical schools will 
be represented on its board, proving Hypothesis 4C and Hypothesis 6C true.   
There is a strong relationship between the geography of a pharmaceutical 
company and the sales growth of that company.  American companies outperform 
international companies in terms of sales growth on average, which I implied in 
Hypothesis 6D. 
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There is a strong relationship between size and R&D expense with ROA.  
The larger the company, and the greater R&D expense of that company, one can 
confidently imply the greater the ROA of that company.  This is certainly one 
reason why bigger is often better from a financial strength and performance 
barometer, because larger companies will naturally have more assets, and return 
on these assets.   
There is a strong relationship between company size and EPS.  Thus, one 
can confidently imply that EPS will be greater on average for larger 
pharmaceutical companies.  This relationship would indicate to investors that 
larger pharmaceutical companies will yield greater returns on their investments.  
It is quite clear from this dataset that larger pharmaceutical companies simply 
outperform small ones and this is reflective in ROA and EPS.  However, larger 
pharmaceutical companies do not necessarily grow faster than smaller companies, 
as I did not find a significant relationship between company size and sales growth. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In my study I have discovered that R&D expense and company size 
proved to be the most consistent predictors of the dependent variables I tested.    
Larger pharmaceutical companies, with greater R&D expenses had more 
diversified boards, and were particularly more likely to have university 
connections.  While patterns emerged amongst domestic vs. international 
pharmaceutical companies, and S&P 500 companies vs. non-S&P 500 companies, 
there were not consistent relationships between these variables and board 
characteristics.  Ultimately the best predictor of a company utilizing university 
employees as directors on its board is the size of that company.  Size and R&D 
expense go hand in hand, as larger pharmaceutical companies spend more.  While 
it was revealing to see that the size of a pharmaceutical company strongly 
correlates with its board university connections, ultimately the most important 
question is does having these connections matter?  I did not find any direct 
evidence in my data that these connections directly impact performance.  There 
was not a significant relationship in my multiple regression results that indicated a 
relationship between any of the board characteristics tested and the performance 
metrics of sales growth, ROA, or EPS.   
However, what we do know is that larger pharmaceutical companies 
outperform small ones.  When it comes down to it, the ultimate objective of these 
companies and any for-profit companies for that matter is to make money.  As 
publicly traded companies these firms must also satisfy their shareholders.  While 
the university-board relationship is quite significant I have found, ultimately these 
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companies need to perform and make money, whatever their strategy towards 
innovation or corporate governance may be.  To me, the most revealing results 
therefore in my study were not that bigger companies spend more on R&D or 
have more university connections, but that bigger pharmaceutical companies 
significantly outperform the smaller ones.  There was a strong relationship 
between size and EPS and size and ROA.  Quite simply, ‘Big Pharma,’ yields 
greater returns on investment to their shareholders; they make their shareholders 
more money.  But in the end that’s why they are ‘Big Pharma,’ they became a 
blockbuster company by selling blockbuster drugs.  They sell more drugs, and 
bigger drugs at that, because they have better quality R&D and more of it.  They 
benefit from greater R&D pipelines that in return yield more innovation.   
 While my data does not show a direct link between university connections 
on a board and performance of that company, what we do know is that the larger 
pharmaceutical companies are more likely to have such connections, and that 
larger pharmaceutical companies outperform smaller ones.  This trend wouldn’t 
exist and be so consistent if these connections didn’t help however.  Even if the 
benefit of university connections on a pharmaceutical board can be directly linked 
to sales growth, EPS, or ROA of that company, as I have argued throughout my 
paper, the benefits of such connections go far beyond monetary  Ultimately, 
leading pharmaceutical companies need university research to survive, and 
electing leading professionals from these universities as directors on their 
respective firms’ boards, an alliance is created; a relationship is establish, and 
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university-industry communication and strategic goals for research can be more 
easily aligned. 
I will conclude by returning to the initial point: “The human race can 
survive perfectly well without an endless supply of new drugs but the 
corporations that produce them can’t” (Law, 2006).  It is quite clear that the 
pharmaceutical industry will try to get any edge it can to develop new drugs.  
Sustainability and growth is inconceivable without new drugs, and new drugs 
cannot be discovered without innovation.  You must give the credit where credit 
is due.  Pharmaceutical innovation is born through research and development 
performed by the government, small biotechnology companies, and most 
importantly, academic institutions; i.e. Harvard University.  Due to this fact, 
pharmaceutical companies will continue to create strategic alliances with the 
‘Harvard’s’ of the world in order to tap into their increasingly valuable R&D.   
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APPENDICES 
 
A- Data Examples: Pfizer vs. EpiCept (The Extremes) 
 
 Pfizer Inc. EpiCept Corp 
Size (log of assets)* 11.6186 0.8202 
Total Assets $111,148,000,000 $2,271,000 
Employees 81,800 21 
Revenue (Net Sales) $48,341,000,000 $265,000 
Sales Growth (2006-08) 0.001 (0.1%) -0.644 (-64%) 
Earnings before Interest & Taxes (EBIT) $16,835,000,000 -$21,957,000 
Return on Assets (ROA) 7% -1118% 
Return on Equity (ROE) 14% 143% 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) Diluted  $1.19 -$0.41 
EPS Basic $1.19 -$0.41 
R&D Expense $8,578,000,000 $12,623,000 
R&D Growth (2006-08) 0.009 (0.9%) -0.493 (-49%) 
R&D (as percent of sales) 18% 4763% 
Market Value of Equity $1.19E+11 $52,764,800 
Market Value of Equity Growth (2006-08) -0.195 (-19%) 0.067 (7%) 
Tobin’s q 1.15 23.36 
Geography 0 0 
S&P 500 1 0 
Board Size** 14 6 
Men 12 6 
Men (% of board) 86% 100% 
Women  2 0 
Women (% of board) 14% 0% 
Insiders 2 1 
Insiders (% of board) 14% 17% 
Outsiders 12 5 
Chairman = CEO? 1 0 
Medical University Connections 3 0 
Non-Medical University Connections 1 0 
Total University Connections 4 0 
% Board University Connections 29% 0% 
University Ranking Total 20 0 
Top-100 Medical School Connections 4 0 
*     Firm Data from 2008 
**   Board characteristics from 2009 
- Geography (Domestic 0, Foreign 1) 
- S&P 500 (Yes=1, No=0) 
- Chairman=CEO? (Yes=1, No=0) 
- Univ. Ranking Total: (University ranked: 1-100=5, 101-200=4, 201-300=3, 301-400=2, 401-500=1) 
- Top 100 medical school (1 for every representation) 
- Tobin’s q: the ratio between the market value and replacement value of the same physical asset.  The 
ratio represents quality of R&D (If Tobin's q is greater than 1.0, then the market value is greater than the 
value of the company's recorded assets 
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B - Director Profiles Example (Pfizer Inc.) 
*Note that EpiCept does not have university connections on its board. 
 
 
Board 
Member 
Title Committee 
Memberships 
Profile 
Dennis A. 
Ausiello, M.D 
Jackson 
Professor of 
Clinical 
Medicine at 
Harvard 
Medical School    
• Audit 
• Audit Financial 
Experts 
• Science and Tech  
• Corporate 
Governance 
The Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine at 
Harvard Medical School and Chief of Medicine at 
Massachusetts General Hospital since 1996. 
President of the Association of American Physicians 
in 2006. Member of the Institute of Medicine and a 
Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. Director of MicroCHIPS (drug delivery 
technology) and Advisor to the Chairman of the 
Board of TIAX (formerly Arthur D. Little). Our 
Director since December 2006. Member of our 
Audit Committee, our Science and Technology 
Committee and our Corporate Governance 
Committee. 
Michael S. 
Brown, M.D. 
Regental 
Professor: 
University of 
Texas 
Southwestern 
Medical Center 
at Dallas 
• Corporate 
Governance  
• Science and Tech 
Distinguished Chair in Biomedical Sciences since 
1989 and Regental Professor since 1985 at the 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at 
Dallas. Co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine in 1985 and the National 
Medal of Science in 1988. Member of the National 
Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine and 
Foreign Member of the Royal Society (London). 
Director of Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Our 
Director since 1996. Chair of our Science and 
Technology Committee and member of our 
Corporate Governance Committee. 
William C. 
Steere, Jr. 
Director of the 
New York 
University 
Medical Center 
• Science and Tech Chairman Emeritus of Pfizer Inc. since July 2001. 
Chairman of our Board from 1992 to April 2001 and 
our Chief Executive Officer from 1991 to 2000. 
Director of MetLife, Inc. and Health Management 
Associates, Inc. Director of the New York 
University Medical Center and the New York 
Botanical Garden. Member of the Board of 
Overseers of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer 
Center. Our Director since 1987 and a member of 
our Science and Technology Committee. 
Dana G. Mead, 
Ph.D. 
Chairman of the 
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology 
• Compensation 
• Science and Tech 
Chairman of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Corporation since July 1, 2003. Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of Tenneco, Inc. from 1994 until 
his retirement in 1999. Chairman of two of the 
successor companies of the Tenneco conglomerate, 
Tenneco Automotive Inc. and Pactiv Corporation, 
global manufacturing companies with operations in 
automotive parts and packaging, from November 
1999 to March 2000. Chairman of the Board of the 
Ron Brown Award for Corporate Leadership and a 
Lifetime Trustee of the Association of Graduates, 
U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Former 
Chairman of the Business Roundtable and the 
National Association of Manufacturers. Our 
Director since 1998. Chair of our Compensation 
Committee and a member of our Science and 
Technology Committee. 
 
 
*The above data represents four of the 99 director profiles that I gathered across 55 
pharmaceutical companies that had university representation on their board 
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C - Multiple Regression Tables: 
 
†p < 0.1 (weak relationship)      *p < 0.05 (medium relationship)     **p < 0.01 (strong relationship) 
 
 
Predictor % Women on Board 
Constant 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Size 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
Geography -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
S&P 500 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R&D Expense 0.00 0.00  
Sales Growth 0.01   
ROA  0.01  
EPS   0.00 
R-Sq 27.2% 27.1% 27.0% 
 
 
 
Predictor % Insiders on Board 
Constant 0.15 0.12 0.14 
Size 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Geography 0.00 0.05 0.05 
S&P 500 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
R&D Expense 0.00 0.00
† 0.00 
Sales Growth 0.02
†  -0.01 
ROA  -0.02  
EPS   -0.01 
R-Sq 8.1% 7.7% 7.2% 
 
 
 
Predictor Chairman = CEO 
Total Assets 9.55E-6 8.45E-6 5.67E-6 
Geography -1.05 -1.25 -1.06 
S&P 500 2.65* 2.43† 2.63* 
R&D as % of sales -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
Sales Growth -0.06   
ROA  0.66  
EPS    0.10 
R-Sq 15.2% 16.8% 14.9% 
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Predictor University-Medical Connections on Board 
Constant 0.10 -0.10 0.00 
Size 0.08
† 0.12* 0.11* 
Geography -0.28 -0.32 -0.31 
S&P 500 0.07 0.01 0.05 
R&D Expense 0.00* 0.00
† 0.00* 
Sales Growth 0.18   
ROA  -0.13  
EPS   -0.07 
R-Sq 25.3% 25.0% 25.4% 
 
 
 
Predictor University-Other Connections on Board  
Constant 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
Size 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Geography 0.07 0.11 0.11 
S&P 500 0.38
† 0.40† 0.40* 
R&D Expense 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sales Growth -0.09   
ROA  -0.01  
EPS   -0.01 
R-Sq 22.6% 21.9% 22.0% 
 
 
 
Predictor University-Total Connections on Board 
Constant 0.11 -0.14 -0.02 
Size 0.10* -0.15* 0.13* 
Geography -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 
S&P 500 0.49 0.44 0.48 
R&D Expense 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 
Sales Growth 0.11   
ROA  -0.16  
EPS   -0.09 
R-Sq 37.3% 37.6% 38.3% 
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Predictor % Board University Connections 
Constant 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Size 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Geography -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
S&P 500 0.04 0.04 0.04 
R&D Expense 0.00
† 0.00 0.00† 
Sales Growth 0.00   
ROA  -0.02  
EPS   -0.01 
R-Sq 18.0% 18.6% 19.2% 
 
 
 
Predictor University Ranking Total 
Constant 0.32 -0.34 -0.20 
Size 0.43
† 0.56* 0.54* 
Geography -1.19 -1.31 -1.24 
S&P 500 1.40 1.17 1.31 
R&D Expense 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
Sales Growth 0.06   
ROA  -0.44  
EPS   -0.36 
R-Sq 39.7% 39.5% 40.2% 
 
 
 
Predictor Top 100 Medical Schools Represented 
Constant -0.05 -0.28 -0.20 
Size 0.08
† 0.12* 0.11* 
Geography -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 
S&P 500 0.30 0.24 0.28 
R&D Expense 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
Sales Growth 0.17   
ROA  -0.15  
EPS   -0.11 
R-Sq 40.6% 40.5% 42.1% 
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Predictor Sales Growth 
Constant 0.14 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Size 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Geography -0.31* -0.36** -0.31* -0.30* -0.32* -0.32* -0.33* -0.31* -0.31* 
S&P 500 -0.24 -0.22 -0.27 -0.24 -0.19 -0.25 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 
R&D Expense -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% Women 0.46         
% Insiders  0.66
†        
Chairman = CEO?   0.09       
University-Med    0.07      
University-Other     -0.10     
University-Total      0.03    
% Board Univ       0.04   
Univ Ranking        0.01  
Top 100 Med         0.08 
R-Sq 7.3% 8.4% 7.4% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 6.9% 7.4% 8.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor Return on Assets (ROA) 
Constant -1.68 -1.58 -1.71 -1.70 -1.68 -1.68 -1.66 -1.68 -1.69 
Size 0.24** 0.24** 0.24** 0.25** 0.24** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 
Geography 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
S&P 500 -0.14 -0.16 -0.21 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 
R&D Expense 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
% Women 0.33         
% Insiders  -0.65        
Chairman = CEO?   0.18
†       
University-Med    -0.06      
University-Other     0.87     
University-Total      -0.06    
% Board Univ       -0.45   
Univ Ranking         -0.01  
Top 100 Med          -0.09 
R-Sq 45.0% 45.6% 46.0% 45.3% 44.9% 45.4% 45.3% 45.1% 45.6% 
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Predictor Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Constant -1.60 -1.50 -1.69 -1.66 -1.68 -1.65 -1.59 -1.66 -1.69 
Size 0.25** 0.26** 0.26** 0.28** 0.26** 0.28** 0.27** 0.28** 0.29** 
Geography 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 
S&P 500 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.30 
R&D Expense 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% Women 0.66         
% Insiders  -1.17        
Chairman = CEO?   0.07       
University-Med    -0.21      
University-Other     -0.11     
University-Total      -0.21    
% Board Univ       -1.62   
Univ Ranking         -0.04  
Top 100 Med          -0.36 
R-Sq 31.8% 32.2% 31.6% 32.7% 31.8% 33.1% 32.8% 32.8% 34.3% 
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D - Correlation Table 
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Chairmanceo 1.00                         
Univmed 0.04 1.00                        
 0.67                         
Univother 0.18 0.15 1.00                       
 0.06 0.13                        
univtotal~s 0.11 0.88 0.59 1.00                      
 0.26 0.00 0.00                       
Boarduniv 0.08 0.85 0.53 0.94 1.00                     
 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00                      
university~u 0.11 0.89 0.41 0.91 0.83 1.00                    
 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00                     
top100medi~s 0.12 0.83 0.36 0.83 0.72 0.92 1.00                   
 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00                    
Boardsize 0.09 0.45 0.38 0.54 0.33 0.55 0.58 1.00                  
 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00                   
Menofboard -0.21 -0.21 -0.15 -0.24 -0.14 -0.25 -0.24 -0.40 1.00                 
 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00                  
womenofboard 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.25 0.24 0.40 -1.00 1.00                
 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00                 
insidersof~d -0.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 1.00               
 0.61 0.48 0.14 0.72 0.68 0.86 0.99 0.25 0.95 0.95                
total_assets 0.17 0.40 0.39 0.51 0.33 0.54 0.54 0.63 -0.24 0.24 -0.14 1.00              
 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15               
Employee 0.16 0.41 0.39 0.53 0.34 0.54 0.51 0.64 -0.28 0.28 -0.12 0.96 1.00             
 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00              
revenuenet~s 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.53 0.35 0.56 0.53 0.60 -0.28 0.28 -0.13 0.97 0.98 1.00            
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00             
sales~200608 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.15 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 1.00           
 0.47 0.57 0.57 0.47 0.44 0.54 0.62 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.12 0.66 0.64 0.65            
Ebit 0.16 0.44 0.38 0.54 0.36 0.57 0.55 0.58 -0.26 0.26 -0.11 0.96 0.96 0.98 -0.04 1.00          
 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67           
roanetinco~s 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.27 -0.26 0.26 -0.03 0.17 0.18 0.17 -0.00 0.17 1.00         
 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.34 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.97 0.08          
Roe 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 -0.26 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.06 1.00        
 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.52 0.49 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.80 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.52         
Epsdiluted 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.40 -0.26 0.26 -0.10 0.53 0.59 0.58 -0.05 0.56 0.31 0.01 1.00       
 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.89        
rdaspercen~s -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 0.20 -0.20 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.97 -0.03 -0.09 -0.36 0.10 -0.12 1.00      
 0.22 0.20 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.64 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.75 0.34 0.00 0.28 0.20       
marketvalu~y 0.19 0.39 0.42 0.52 0.35 0.54 0.51 0.59 -0.27 0.27 -0.11 0.95 0.97 0.99 -0.04 0.97 0.17 0.03 0.57 -0.09 1.00     
 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.07 0.79 0.00 0.33      
captialexp~s 0.15 0.38 0.40 0.50 0.33 0.52 0.49 0.60 -0.26 0.26 -0.13 0.94 0.97 0.98 -0.04 0.95 0.17 0.03 0.57 -0.09 0.98 1.00    
 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.08 0.79 0.00 0.33 0.00     
Tobinsq -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.133 -0.13 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.70 -0.09 -0.09 0.36 -0.05 -0.06 1.00   
 0.41 0.48 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.60 0.57 0.17 0.17 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.89 0.51 0.00 0.38 0.37 0.01 0.64 0.52    
Geography -0.19 -0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.06 -0.06 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.24 -0.07 0.24 0.15 -0.01 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.27 -0.97 1.00  
 0.05 0.69 0.26 0.81 0.45 0.91 0.67 0.01 0.55 0.55 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.48 0.01 0.11 0.91 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.48   
sp500 0.39 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.41 0.37 -0.32 0.32 -0.16 0.43 0.43 0.46 -0.05 0.44 0.15 0.02 0.29 -0.09 0.44 0.40 -0.09 -0.17 1.00 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.11 0.84 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.07  
 
*Bolded numbers indicate the correlation is significant at a p-value below 0.1.
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E- Frequency of University Representation on Boards 
 
College 
# of 
Instances 
Top 100 
Med 
Top 
500 U 
1-
100 
101-
200 
201-
300 
301-
400 
401-
500 
Yale 2 x x X         
Alabama-Birmingham 1   x   x       
Harvard 10 x x X         
Texas Southwestern 5 x x X         
NYU 1 x x X         
MIT 4 x x X         
Vanderbilt 1 x x X         
Upenn 3 x x X         
Morehouse 3               
Michigan 1   x X         
Emory 3 x x X         
Duke 4 x x X         
Stanford 5 x x X         
Pittsburgh 1 x x X         
USC 2 x x X         
Depaul 1               
UMDNJ 1 x x     x     
Bar-Ilan 1   x       x   
Netanya Academic 1               
Oxford 4 x x X         
Imperial 1 x x X         
American College of Rheumatology 1               
Charleston 1               
Ashkelon Academic  1               
Ben-Gurion 1               
Temple 1   x       x   
Lehigh 1               
Indiana  1   x x         
Cal San Diego 1 x x x         
Washington U (St. Louis) 1 x x x         
Miami 1 x x   x       
Mainz 1   x   x       
Mount Sinai 3   x   x       
Manchester 1 x x x         
Cincinnati 1 x x   x       
Huddinge 1               
Karolinska Institute  1 x x x         
McGill 1 x x x         
Dalhousie 1               
Hebrew U of Jerusalem 1   x x         
Tel Aviv 1   x   x       
Maryland 1   x x         
Columbia 1 x x x         
Rice 1   x x         
American College of Physicians 1               
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American College of Chest Physicians 1               
King College 1               
Louisville 1               
Carnegie Mellon 1   x x         
Sydney  1   x x         
Tufts 2 x x   x       
The Cancer Institute of New Jersey 1               
Robert Wood Johnson School of 
Medicine 1               
Institute for Advanced Study 1               
Princeton 1   x x         
Case School of Medicine 1               
Cambridge 1 x x x         
Scripps Research Institute 1               
UNC-Wilmington 1               
University of Heidelberg 1 x x x         
Johns Hopkins 1 x x x         
San Diego State 1   x       X   
Mayo 1               
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SUMMARY OF CAPSTONE PROJECT 
 
For my capstone project I have taken an in-depth look at the 
pharmaceutical industry.  I have particularly focused my study on the 
collaboration between pharmaceutical companies and academic institutions. 
Before further detailing the study itself, I must first outline the importance of 
industry-university relations in the pharmaceutical industry.  This relationship 
boils down to research and development.  In order to understand the great 
importance of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry it is important to first learn 
about patents.  One cannot describe the pharmaceutical industry without 
mentioning patents.  When blockbuster drug monopolies expire after 20 years of 
patent protection, the companies that make these drugs are forced to continue to 
innovate; utilizing new drug technologies and an extensive and diverse pipelines 
of R&D in order to bring new drugs to the market.  However, developing new 
drugs is not a given, and in fact, new drugs are becoming more and more of a 
rarity in an industry that needs them in order to be sustainable.  Companies simply 
cannot exist solely on blockbusters when generics or ‘me-too’ drugs steal their 
market share as their patent lives wear off.  Numerous methods and strategies 
exist to keep the drug pipeline pumping.  A common move is for pharmaceutical 
companies to join strategic alliances, merge, or acquire other firms. When this 
occurs, the joint or parent company increases its catalog of not only drugs 
presently on the market, but drugs in development and research pipelines to create 
the necessary innovation for future sustainability.   
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 While the pharmaceutical industry regards itself as a research-based, life-
saving industry, justifying high drug prices to fund present and future 
development, many may be surprised to learn that most of the R&D in this 
industry is outsourced, and not in the research labs of Pfizer or Johnson & 
Johnson.  So the question becomes, where is this R&D outsourced to?  The 
majority of the R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is performed by (1) the 
government, the National Institute of Health (NIH), (2) small biotechnology 
companies, and (3) academic institutions.   
Number (3) is where I have focused this study.  When the corporate 
governance of pharmaceutical companies is examined, a common theme becomes 
apparent.  Pharmaceutical companies often have university employees on their 
boards of directors, and thus university connections.  Whether they are medical 
professors, non-medical professors, or even chancellors, the fact of the matter is 
that these directors are affiliated with a university; a potential R&D pipeline for 
the pharmaceutical industry.  Thus, my initial reaction was, you don’t have to 
look much further than a pharmaceutical companies’ board of directors to learn 
what kind of university research connections it has.   
To offer a brief illustration of the initial research I conducted, and the data 
I extracted, I will highlight Johnson & Johnson, an American pharmaceutical 
company with over 118,000 employees and $63.747 billion in sales in 2008 (the 
largest pharmaceutical company in the world at the time, which has now been 
surpassed by Pfizer following its late 2009 acquisition of Wyeth).  Johnson & 
Johnson currently has 10 directors on its board, four of whom are employed by 
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universities.  These include two medical-related university employees: Susan L. 
Lindquist, Ph.D., Professor of Biology at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; and David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D., Director at the Morehouse School 
of Medicine, and two non-medical university employees: Mary Sue Coleman, 
Ph.D., President of the University of Michigan, and Michael M.E. Johns, M.D., 
Chancellor of Emory University.  With one of the largest pharmaceutical 
companies in the world having a board made up of 40% university employees, 
one would be safe to assume that their place on the board matters, and matters 
greatly.  Based on credible international university rankings and medical school 
rankings we can then identify the quality of the universities these directors come 
from and the type of pharmaceutical companies that utilize them.  Certainly one 
would expect a larger, more established pharmaceutical company to be more 
likely to have a Harvard Medical School professor on its board than a smaller, 
unproven company.  But if this expectation is in fact a reality, what realistic 
difference does it make?  How does having such connections impact the 
company? And what types of pharmaceutical companies have such university 
connections on their boards?      
The paper is divided into two main parts: (1) a literature review, where I 
summarize and analyze the main themes in the pharmaceutical industry, with 
focus on university-industry relations, based on literature I read over a year’s 
time, and (2) Statistical analysis, where I hypothesized the relationships of 
numerous company metrics in my dataset, performed multiple regressions, and 
analyzed the results.  Before I could test data, I needed to gather it.     
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Using COMPUSTAT data from Wharton Research Data Services with the 
SIC Code of 2834, Pharmaceutical Preparations, to extract data on the industry, I 
initially arrived at 222 companies.  I further narrowed my dataset down to 109 
companies by eliminating all companies that did not have complete or sufficient 
data available at a firm or board level.  These 109 companies’ boards were then 
researched one-by-one noting many board characteristics such board size, gender 
breakdown, insiders vs. outsiders, if the chairman is/isn’t the CEO,  university 
members (medical and non-medical), committee memberships of these university 
members, and the proportion of university members on the boards.  Profiles were 
created for all board directors who were presently employed by universities.  In 
my database I have a total of 99 director profiles who are employed by a 
university.  All board-level data was gathered during the latter half of 2009. 
In order to answer my initial questions and test my hypotheses it was 
necessary to test the data I had gathered.  Prior to testing, all of the data had to be 
populated completely, and checked over numerous times for accuracy.  For some 
variables such as ‘total university ranking,’ which represented the power and 
quality of universities on a pharmaceutical companies board, coding schemes had 
to be developed.  While I initially found basic descriptive statistics such as mean, 
max, min, etc. in order to discover and eliminate any potential outliers, eventually 
I performed regressions.  The setup for multiple regression was to test a number 
of independent firm-level variables (data gathered from 2008) to predict board 
characteristics (depend variables). Company size (log of assets), geography, S&P 
500 Index, R&D expense, and performance metrics of return on assets (ROA), 
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earnings per share (EPS), and sales growth (2006-2008) were used to predict the 
board characteristics of percent of women on a board, percent of insiders on a 
board, chairman=CEO?, number of medical university connections, non-medical 
university connections, total university connections, power and quality of 
universities represented, and top-100 medical schools represented.  The purpose 
of these multiple regressions was to see what type of companies had these 
particular board characteristics; what type of pharmaceutical companies had 
university connections on their boards?  The different independent variables are 
designed to see if geographic location, size, investment in innovation, and/or 
performance impact its board makeup.  The next set of multiple regressions set 
the performance metrics of ROA, EPS, and sales growth as the dependent 
variables, and the independent variables of geography, S&P 500, R&D expense, 
and board characteristics were used to predict performance.  This model was to 
answer the question: Does having university connections on a pharmaceutical 
board matter?  Thus, does it impact company performance?       
The strength of relationships between variables based on the output of the 
multiple regression models was analyzed using the p-value of the t-statistic.  The 
p-value represents the level of statistical significance.  The scale used to analyze 
such strength was if p < 0.1, there was a weak relationship, a medium-strength 
relationship if p < 0.05, and a strong relationship if p < 0.01. 0.00 would be the 
lowest p-value possible, and represent the strongest relationship.  For p-values 
greater than 0.1, I considered the variables to have no significant relationship.   
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 The key findings of this study were that the larger the pharmaceutical 
company and the greater the R&D expenses of that company the more likely the 
company would have university connections on its board of directors.  The larger 
the company, the better the universities and medical schools these directors would 
be employed at.  These connections are believed to symbolize and secure strategic 
alliances between pharmaceutical companies and academic institutions.  
Pharmaceutical companies can therefore tap into innovative research pipelines at 
these universities for new drug discovery and development.  While there was not 
strong evidence that university connections on a pharmaceutical board directly 
impacted company performance, larger pharmaceutical companies, who were 
more likely to utilize such connections, did yield greater earnings per share and 
return on assets than smaller companies, who were less likely to utilize such 
connections on their boards.                  
The data has strongly shows that larger companies with greater investment 
in innovation are more likely to utilize university employees as directors on their 
boards.  In my literature I suggest many potential reasons for these connections 
such as establishing a liaison position to create closer communication, firms 
creating strategic alliances with universities, and using such connections to tap 
into university research pipelines.  While one would be wise to conclude that 
board university connections give pharmaceutical companies an edge in 
innovation, it is difficult to conclude how significant this edge is.  While there is 
quite a clear pattern between size and university connections, the pattern is not 
always consistent.  Not every company follows ‘the rule.’  Not every company 
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utilizes university employees on their boards.  I believe these connections can 
have a tremendously positive impact on a pharmaceutical company, but the data 
doesn’t always directly suggest that.  Business is not a perfect science and there is 
not always a right or wrong way of doing things.  However, some things can help, 
and while pharmaceutical companies clearly have different strategies when 
structuring their boards, ‘big pharma’ trends towards having as many quality 
university connections as possible on their boards.   
It is quite clear that the pharmaceutical industry will try to get any edge it 
can to develop new drugs.  Sustainability and growth is inconceivable without 
new drugs, and new drugs cannot be discovered without innovation.  
Pharmaceutical innovation is born through research and development performed 
by the government, small biotechnology companies, and most importantly, 
academic institutions.  Due to this fact, pharmaceutical companies will continue 
to create strategic alliances with these institutions in order to tap into their ever-
valuable R&D.     
   
